

- MARÍA JOSÉ FRÁPOLLI SANZ, *Russell vs Frege. Whose paradox?*.

Department of Philosophy, University of Granada, Spain.

E-mail: frapolli@ugr.es.

From Frege's semantics, Russell's paradox does not follow. This claim admits a historical and a conceptual reading. In its historical interpretation, this claim amounts to the thesis that Frege actually possessed the resources to answer Russell's criticisms concerning the paradox, criticisms for which both authors mistakenly blamed Basic Law V. Conceptually, the claim is weaker: namely, that Frege's writings contain sufficient indications for developing a genuinely Fregean solution to the paradox within his semantic framework. We defend the stronger thesis, though the weaker one may reassure those reluctant to reconsider a substantial portion of the twentieth-century debate on logicism.

On either reading, Russell's arguments do have serious consequences—though probably not the ones he intended. They undermine the algebraic and formalist approach associated with Boole, Schröder, and also Russell, while leaving Frege's system untouched. Indeed, if our interpretation is correct, Frege's logicism is the path twentieth-century logic should have pursued instead of the set-theoretical framework that eventually prevailed. The label "Russell's paradox" may still be retained if desired; however, historical accuracy would require a shift in its reference.