

Tatiana Velásquez
Plural Logic without Eliminativism.
Universidad Nacional de Colombia.
E-mail: lvelasquezr@unal.edu.co.

One of the main points of plural logic is its defense of plural terms *at face value*, that is, without changing the number of expressions in the logical translation. Consider the following sentence:

Anna and Liev built a beautiful home together

There appear to be, at first glance, two options: (1) take Anna and Liev as standing for a singular term bearing a joint predicate. But also (2) take the plural terms as if they were denoting nothing more than themselves. In this regard, some authors have proposed that pluralities should be considered as *nothing over and above their members* (Roberts, 2022; Florio and Linnebo, 2021). Then, for a semantic and logic theory to work, they should embrace a new set of variables, quantification expressions and machinery to make it accountable for plurals, setting aside partially or completely the previous tools, such as sets, groups, collections and any talk about unity. We will show that even if we pursue only partial elimination of unity terms, the exhaustive nothing over and above restriction will lead to their total elimination. We argue that pluralities can coherently be viewed both as many and as one. This will constitute a structural approach (cf. Shapiro, 1997; Ritchie, 2013) which prevents the elimination of plural terms in favor of singularist notions, while simultaneously avoiding elimination in the opposite direction.

References

- Florio, Salvatore Linnebo, Øystein. *The Many and the One: A Philosophical Study of Plural Logic*. Oxford University Press, 2021.
- Ritchie, Katherine. What are groups? *Philosophical Studies* 166- 2 (2013):257-272.
- Roberts, Sam. Pluralities as Nothing Over and Above. *Journal of Philosophy*, 119-8(2022):405-424.
- Shapiro, Stewart. *Philosophy of Mathematics: Structure and Ontology*. OUP, 1997.