

- RICARDO ARTURO NICOLÁS-FRANCISCO, *On connexive variants of a fragment of discussive logic*.

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In this paper, we present some connexive logics based on a fragment of discussive logic. In [3], Omori presented the disjunction-free fragment of discussive logic (see [2]) as a three-valued logic, motivated by a discussive model in which there is a disagreement between two participants in a discussion. The discussion model can also be used to motivate other non-classical logics, in particular connexive ones.

First, we modify the implication of the logic presented in [3] in order to obtain a connexive variant of the three-valued version of discussive logic. This implication can still be rightly regarded as discussive, because it is the result of modifying its falsity condition, while retaining the truth condition. We note that the resulting implication has already been presented in [1]. We present an axiomatization for the logic with this implication.

In a second step, we expand the language of discussive logic with connexive implications, leaving the original implication untouched. We also discuss possible motivations of this expansion using the discussive model presented in [3], and its similarities with Pizzi and Williamson's work on connexive logic [4].

[1] WILLIAM S. COOPER, *The propositional logic of ordinary discourse*, ***Inquiry***, vol. 11 (1968), no. 1-4, pp. 295–320.

[2] STANISŁAW JAŚKOWSKI, *A propositional Calculus for inconsistent deductive systems*, ***Logic and Logical Philosophy***, vol. 7 (1999), no. 7, pp. 35–56.

[3] HITOSHI OMORI, *The Disjunction-Free Fragment of  $D_2$  is Three-Valued*, ***Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science*** (Non-Classical Logics. Theory and Applications), (Andrzej Indrzejczak, Michał Zawidzki, editors), vol. 415, Open Publishing Association, 2024, pp. 257–270.

[4] CLAUDIO PIZZI AND TIMOTHY WILLIAMSON, *Strong Boethius' Thesis and Consequential Implication*, ***Journal of Philosophical Logic***, vol. 26 (1997), no. 5, pp. 569–588.