

- ▶ ALBA MASSOLO, *A reevaluation of psychologism in logic*.

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Traditionally, psychologism has maintained that logic is fundamentally a psychological phenomenon grounded in human inferential processes. However, the prevailing tradition in the philosophy of logic has strongly rejected this view, relying mainly on criticisms leveled by Frege and Husserl in the early 20th century. The anti-psychologistic conception, which became established as the dominant position, posits a radical independence of logic from reasoning. Consequently, the term “psychologism” has been used almost exclusively in a pejorative manner. A direct consequence of this anti-psychologistic dominance has been the strengthening of logical exceptionalism: the view that logic is a unique discipline, distinct from the empirical sciences, characterized as a priori, analytic, necessary, formal, general, and foundational. However, the growing influence of current anti-exceptionalist positions has begun to challenge the privileged and unique status of logic, opening the way for a reevaluation of psychologistic theses in a new light.

To address this reevaluation of psychologism, I propose a distinction between four ways of understanding the relationship between logic and reasoning: (1) Extreme anti-psychologism, which posits the complete independence of logic from psychological phenomena and vice versa. (2) Moderate anti-psychologism, according to which logic is independent but normative for reasoning, thus characterizing the standard Fregean conception. (3) Moderate psychologism, according to which there is a bidirectional influence: logic has cognitive bases while playing a normative role in reasoning. (4) Extreme psychologism, which holds a reductive identity between logic and the description of inferential processes, such that logic constitutes a description of psychological phenomena.

The aim of this presentation is to defend the third variant: moderate psychologism. Using Benacerraf’s dilemma, I distinguish between the metaphysical and epistemological aspects of the discussion. I argue that, while anti-psychologism can justify the metaphysical necessity of logic, it faces insurmountable difficulties in accounting for epistemological aspects such as our access to logical knowledge. Conversely, I maintain that moderate psychologism offers a naturalistic solution to the epistemological access problem and allows for the justification of a meliorative role for logic. In this way, I argue that logic is not limited to describing inferential processes but rather emerges from our cognitive capacities and can improve them.