

- WALTER CARNIELLI, *An Outlook on Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems from a Paraconsistent Perspective*.

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We examine the scope and philosophical significance of Gödel's incompleteness theorems by reconsidering their standard formulations within the framework of paraconsistent Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs). The flexibility of negation in LFIs, together with the possibility of recovering classical reasoning in a sentence-wise manner, allows for alternative and conceptually revealing formalizations of Gödelian arguments.

Although Gödel's theorems do not directly hold in sufficiently weak LFIs, we show that they can be recovered by explicitly introducing premises expressing consistency in the LFI sense. This reconstruction makes visible a degree of freedom that is usually implicit in classical presentations of incompleteness.

From a philosophical standpoint, this approach invites a reassessment of the scope of Gödel's results and clarifies the assumptions underlying their interpretation—particularly the view that incompleteness is meta-constructive but object-theoretically non-constructive. This is a joint work with D. Fuenmayor.

[1] W. A. CARNIELLI AND M. E. CONIGLIO, *Paraconsistent Logic: Consistency, Contradiction and Negation*, Springer, 2016.

[2] W. A. CARNIELLI AND D. FUENMAYOR, *Gödel's incompleteness theorems from a paraconsistent perspective*, *Abstract Consequence and Logics: Essays in Honor of Edelcio G. de Souza*, (A. Costa-Leite editor), Tributes, vol. 42, College Publications, 2020, pp. 173–198.

[3] G. PRIEST, *Inconsistent models of arithmetic; I. Finite models*, *Journal of Philosophical Logic*, vol. 26, no. 2, 1997, pp. 223–235.